Perspectives on financial incentives to health service providers for increasing breast feeding and smoking quit rates during pregnancy: a mixed methods study by Hoddinott, Pat et al.
Perspectives on ﬁnancial incentives to
health service providers for increasing
breast feeding and smoking quit rates
during pregnancy: a mixed methods
study
Pat Hoddinott,1 Gill Thomson,2 Heather Morgan,3 Nicola Crossland,2
Graeme MacLennan,3 Fiona Dykes,2 Fiona Stewart,3 Linda Bauld,4
Marion K Campbell3
To cite: Hoddinott P,
Thomson G, Morgan H, et al.
Perspectives on financial
incentives to health service
providers for increasing
breast feeding and smoking
quit rates during pregnancy:
a mixed methods study. BMJ
Open 2015;5:e008492.
doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2015-
008492
▸ Prepublication history
and additional material is
available. To view please visit
the journal (http://dx.doi.org/
10.1136/bmjopen-2015-
008492).
Received 15 April 2015
Revised 13 July 2015
Accepted 21 July 2015
For numbered affiliations see
end of article.
Correspondence to
Professor Pat Hoddinott;
p.m.hoddinott@stir.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Objective: To explore the acceptability, mechanisms
and consequences of provider incentives for smoking
cessation and breast feeding as part of the Benefits of
Incentives for Breastfeeding and Smoking cessation in
pregnancy (BIBS) study.
Design: Cross-sectional survey and qualitative
interviews.
Setting: Scotland and North West England.
Participants: Early years professionals: 497 survey
respondents included 156 doctors; 197 health visitors/
maternity staff; 144 other health staff. Qualitative
interviews or focus groups were conducted with 68
pregnant/postnatal women/family members; 32 service
providers; 22 experts/decision-makers; 63 conference
attendees.
Methods: Early years professionals were surveyed via
email about the acceptability of payments to local health
services for reaching smoking cessation in pregnancy
and breastfeeding targets. Agreement was measured on
a 5-point scale using multivariable ordered logit
models. A framework approach was used to analyse
free-text survey responses and qualitative data.
Results: Health professional net agreement for
provider incentives for smoking cessation targets was
52.9% (263/497); net disagreement was 28.6% (142/
497). Health visitors/maternity staff were more likely
than doctors to agree: OR 2.35 (95% CI 1.51 to 3.64;
p<0.001). Net agreement for provider incentives for
breastfeeding targets was 44.1% (219/497) and net
disagreement was 38.6% (192/497). Agreement was
more likely for women (compared with men): OR 1.81
(1.09 to 3.00; p=0.023) and health visitors/maternity
staff (compared with doctors): OR 2.54 (95% CI 1.65
to 3.91; p<0.001). Key emergent themes were ‘moral
tensions around acceptability’, ‘need for incentives’,
‘goals’, ‘collective or divisive action’ and ‘monitoring
and proof’. While provider incentives can focus action
and resources, tensions around the impact on
relationships raised concerns. Pressure, burden of
proof, gaming, box-ticking bureaucracies and health
inequalities were counterbalances to potential benefits.
Conclusions: Provider incentives are favoured by
non-medical staff. Solutions which increase trust and
collaboration towards shared goals, without negatively
impacting on relationships or increasing bureaucracy
are required.
BACKGROUND
In the UK, the prevalence of smoking in
pregnancy and breast feeding have shown
only modest improvement in over 15 years.1
At the time of birth in 2010, 12% of UK
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This is the first study to compare the acceptabil-
ity of provider incentives for improving breast
feeding and smoking cessation in pregnancy
rates.
▪ The multidisciplinary team with extensive
service-user involvement, the mixed method
approach with preliminary evidence syntheses
and a rigorous sampling strategy ensured
diverse perspectives were included.
▪ The approach goes beyond existing ‘black box’
policy frameworks to understand why and how
financial incentive schemes might fit within early
years healthcare systems.
▪ The survey of early years professionals, although
the largest of its kind, has potentially more
limited generalisability than we hoped due to
selection and response biases.
▪ Despite our best attempts, we failed to identify
any robust strategy for UK regional or national
surveys of maternity and early years health pro-
fessionals due to the logistic difficulties of identi-
fying and gaining the approval of the
gatekeepers to email lists, particularly in
England.
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women reported smoking.1 Breastfeeding initiation rates
have shown a steady increase to over 80%, but the 55%
prevalence of breast feeding at 6–8 weeks has changed
little and meeting the WHO recommendation of exclu-
sive breast feeding for the ﬁrst 6 months of life seems
distant.1 Similar issues have been reported in the USA in
that while initiation rates continue to rise, continuation
and exclusive breastfeeding rates remain below the
Healthy People 2020 targets.2 National targets for breast
feeding, with up-front resources to help organisations to
meet them, have not resulted in the hoped for increases
in the UK. Conditional ﬁnancial incentives for meeting
targets, either payments or penalties, delivered to care
providers at individual or system level and aligned to
health policy goals are therefore attractive as a potential
solution.
Kane et al3 ‘pay for prevention initiatives’ review identi-
ﬁed several forms of provider incentives, which can
broadly be categorised into two types: pay per service
provided (often called fee-for-service) which may
include a bonus or penalty paid based on assessed per-
formance or a ﬁxed payment (often called capitation or
prospective payment). Provider incentive deﬁnitions are
complex due to the differing health system contexts and
can include a mixture of payment types, delivered at
organisational, group or individual provider level.
Incentivised employment contracts, like the UK govern-
ment UK General Practitioner (GP) primary care
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) contract, can
increase documentation of smoking behaviour, advice
and referral rates to stop smoking services.4 5 QOF con-
tracts can increase protocol-driven care, resulting in
greater consistency and improved organisation of care,
but person-centeredness, patient satisfaction and con-
tinuity of care can decline.6 Some nurses report
enhanced specialist skills,6 but little is known about the
impact on provider–patient or provider–provider rela-
tionships, teamwork or morale.4 6
Smoking cessation in pregnancy and breast feeding
are potential behaviours for provider ﬁnancial incentives
as they have signiﬁcant health, social and economic con-
sequences.7–11 Systematic reviews of possible provider
interventions were undertaken as part of the main
Beneﬁts of Incentives for Breastfeeding and Smoking
cessation in pregnancy (BIBS) study.12 Our deﬁnition of
a provider was: people, either individually, in groups or
organisations, working in Health, Government,
Voluntary Sector or other organisations, who help
women to stop smoking and/or to breast feed. Our def-
inition of incentive was purposively broad to reﬂect the
rapid change occurring in this ﬁeld and include ﬁnan-
cial (positive or negative) and non-ﬁnancial tangible
incentives or rewards delivered directly or indirectly at
local, regional or national level. Our systematic reviews
are reported in full elsewhere.12 They identiﬁed no pro-
vider incentive interventions to increase smoking cessa-
tion in pregnancy outcomes, one non-randomised
Italian intervention of ﬁnancial penalties to
organisations for not meeting targets for breast
feeding13 and two grey literature reports.14 15 The US
Joint Commission has introduced targets for exclusive
breast feeding at the time of hospital discharge as one
of several mandatory requirements for accreditation of
maternity units with more than 1100 births per
annum.15 A review of reviews of health service provider
incentives aiming to change other healthy behaviours
(weight management, exercise, alcohol and addictions),
in all age groups and both sexes, was also undertaken in
the BIBS study.12 No studies were identiﬁed where the
incentive was conditional on veriﬁed patient behaviour
outcomes, with most incentives conditional on provider
documentation of health promotion activity. Provider
incentive interventions predominantly target doctors
and differences in effects of incentivising individuals or
teams are uncertain.3 5 6 12
In this paper, our aim was to understand the accept-
ability, feasibility and mechanisms of action of provider
ﬁnancial incentives for improving smoking cessation
around childbirth and/or breastfeeding outcomes from
the perspectives of early years professionals, key stake-
holders and the target population of childbearing
women and parents. Our deﬁnition of an early years
professional is someone employed by health services in
hospital or in the community whose role directly
impacts on pregnant and/or postnatal women up to at
least 6 months after birth. This includes doctors, mid-
wives, health visitors, nurses, managers/administrators,
allied health professionals and nursing assistants. Health
visitors are qualiﬁed nurses or midwives with additional
experience and training in child health, health promo-
tion, public health and education.
METHODS
Design
We undertook a whole systems approach to integrating
the ﬁndings of the evidence syntheses described above
with primary qualitative and survey research. The
approach was informed by grounded theory16 in that
there was an iterative approach to collecting data from
multiple sources, analysis, reﬁning research questions,
theoretical sampling, revising interview topic guides and
reﬁning the analysis, constantly searching for disconﬁrm-
ing data. Service users contributed feedback throughout
the study.12 In this paper, therefore, we report the
results of surveys of health professionals and contempor-
aneous in-depth qualitative research.
Study settings
The settings for the surveys of the professionals were
primary and secondary early years health services across
Scotland and North West England, and for the qualita-
tive research were health, local authority, community
and voluntary sector services (eg, antenatal clinics, chil-
dren and family centres, mother and baby groups) in
Aberdeenshire and Lancashire. Settings and participants
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were purposively selected for their diverse sociodemo-
graphic characteristics and their different incentive cul-
tures for smoking cessation in pregnancy and breast
feeding. Aberdeenshire had no history of incentive inter-
ventions, whereas in Lancashire incentives had recently
been offered to women for smoking cessation in preg-
nancy17 and breast feeding.18
Data collection for the survey of health professionals
The survey population was maternity unit staff, health
visiting staff, obstetricians, paediatricians, public health
specialists, GPs, practice nurses and policymakers whose
work involves caring for pregnant and postnatal women
and/or infants and who work in Scotland or North West
England. We gained access to email lists for the popula-
tion by contacting research networks, National Health
Service (NHS) Research and Development (R&D)
departments and Royal Colleges. In Scotland, an email
with a link to the online survey was administered through:
▸ The Scottish Primary Care Research Network to all
GP practice managers for distribution to GPs and
staff involved in maternity and early years care;
▸ Individual R&D departments for hospital, maternity
and early years staff;
▸ A mailing list of public health doctors;
▸ A mailing list of paediatricians in training;
▸ Two contacts at the Scottish Government for distribu-
tion to relevant maternity and early years stakeholders.
In North West England, the timing of the survey coin-
cided with the implementation of the Health and Social
Care Act on 1 April 2013. Through discussions with the
Cumbria & Lancashire Research Network, and experts,
it was recommended to commission Binleys (http://
www.binleys.com/), a commercial organisation, to dis-
tribute the survey. The survey was sent by email in May
2013 to 4821 relevant professionals on their mailing list.
Owing to a low response rate, all R&D departments
within the North-West Trusts were asked to distribute the
survey to relevant professionals in July 2013 and health
visiting and midwifery students at University of Central
Lancashire. Full details of distribution and response
rates are provided elsewhere.12
The survey (box 1) asked about acceptability of two
incentive strategies for local health service providers and
were identical to two of the questions in the survey of
the IPSOS MORI general public.19 The strategies related
to (1) payments to local health services for reaching
smoking cessation in pregnancy targets and (2) breast-
feeding targets. Agreement with the strategies was mea-
sured on a ﬁve-point Likert scale. The questions were
developed from the BIBS study evidence syntheses,
service-user involvement, qualitative interviews and
piloted for face validity with the target populations.12 19
Important features of the question design arising from
the developmental work was the requirement for proof
from the target population that the intended behaviour
had been achieved (ie, smoking cessation), due to con-
cerns around gaming inﬂuencing the acceptability.
Data collection for the qualitative research
A range of qualitative methods were adopted and inte-
grated, including unstructured interviews, structured
interviews with vignettes, focus groups, interactive discus-
sions, and collaboration and feedback from service-user
mother and baby groups.12 The purposive and theoret-
ical sampling strategy20 is summarised in table 1. The
initial approach was through staff working in health or
community services, who gained consent for researchers
to make contact with potential participants. This was
ﬂexibly implemented over time, with snowball sampling
included to identify harder to reach, more disadvan-
taged participants and to search for disconﬁrming
perspectives.12
An intervention vignette (box 2) of the only provider
incentive strategy13 identiﬁed in the systematic review12
was used to facilitate more directed discussion. This
helped the research team to gain valuable participant
insights into more concrete aspects of content and deliv-
ery rather than more abstract discussion. The term ‘local
health services’ was selected as the best umbrella term
and qualitative data collection explored how individuals
interpreted who would get the payment.
Survey analysis
An a priori target sample size of 1000 was set for the
early years professionals survey to allow us to estimate
Box 1 Survey questions
Do you agree or disagree that local health services should receive
additional funding if they reach targets for the number of women
who prove that they have stopped smoking during pregnancy?
Precode list:
Strongly agree
Tend to agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Tend to disagree
Strongly disagree
Do you agree or disagree that local health services should receive
additional funding if they reach targets for the number of women
who breastfeed?
Precode list:
Strongly agree
Tend to agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Tend to disagree
Strongly disagree
We would like you to imagine that your local health service is
going to run a scheme that provides incentives for stopping
smoking in pregnancy. What do you think the consequence might
be for participants and/or staff? (Qi) Positive consequences?
(free text) (Qii) Negative consequences? (free text)
We would like you to imagine that your local health service is
going to run a scheme that provides incentives for breast feeding.
What do you think the consequence might be for participants
and/or staff? (Qi) Positive consequences? (free text) (Qii)
Negative consequences? (free text)
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proportions to within 3% margin of error with 95% level
of conﬁdence. A priori questions asked:
1. Is the acceptability of provider incentive strategies
inﬂuenced according to sex; age (categories 18–24,
25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55 and over); ethnicity; having
children (yes, no); personal experience of smoking
(never smoked, ex-smoker, current smoker—failed to
stop, or no attempts to stop); had a child ever been
breast fed (even if for only a day or two); job; survey
region?
2. What are the independent predictors of acceptability
of provider incentives?
Data were described using the appropriate summary
statistics where relevant. Responses to the Likert-style
outcome survey items were summarised by number, per-
centage and mean, and graphed using bar charts.
Responses to these outcome items were tabulated,
broken down by the independent predictor variables spe-
ciﬁed above. Net agreement (agree and strongly agree)
and net disagreement (disagree and strongly disagree)
were also reported as number and percentage. Simple
and multiple ordered logit regression models were used
to determine the independent predictors of acceptability
for the shortlist. The relationship between predictor and
outcome variables was summarised using the OR and
95% CIs. Reference categories were male; white ethni-
city; doctors; no children; never smoked; child breast
fed. Age was entered as 5-year categories. Job was
entered as three categories: doctors; early years nursing/
care staff (midwives, health visitors, maternity care staff)
and other (managers, allied health professionals,
researchers, support staff). All analyses were done in
Stata V.13 (StataCorp, 2013, Stata Statistical Software:
Release 13, College Station, Texas, USA: StataCorp LP).
Qualitative data analysis
All qualitative data were entered into NVivo V.10 soft-
ware (QSR International, Burlington, Massachusetts,
USA). Analysis was informed by the framework method
for applied policy research.21 Initially, three researchers
(NC, HM, GT) identiﬁed key themes and categories
independently by reading transcripts of and listening to
the ﬁrst four participant and four provider interviews.
Through wider research team transcript reading and dis-
cussion, a single tree structure coding index was agreed.
It was applied in NVivo V.10 at two sites, with 2–4 weekly
merges of data sets to facilitate data organisation and
retrieval to generate thematic matrices. The researchers
undertook a detailed analysis of data with regular discus-
sion several times a week between sites to ensure consist-
ency and to search for disconﬁrming perspectives.
Free-text responses to open questions in the health pro-
fessional survey were entered onto a Microsoft Excel
chart and were grouped using content analysis to tri-
angulate the thematic qualitative data analysis. In order
to focus on the variations in the acceptability, feasibility
and meaning of provider incentives, separate analysis of
the qualitative data was undertaken for this paper.
Table 1 Qualitative sampling strategy
Sample Recruitment strategy
Pregnant women and mothers/partners/significant
others from first trimester until 6 months after birth
Researchers approached participants (through staff introduction) at
pregnancy, mother and baby/toddler groups across Aberdeenshire
and Lancashire
Researchers approached participants (through staff introduction) at
antenatal clinics, GP surgeries, hospitals, midwives across
Aberdeenshire and Lancashire
GPs and health visitors, midwives and voluntary workers across
Aberdeenshire and Lancashire
Partners/significant others through women already participating
Providers of care/stakeholders
Midwives, health visitors, obstetricians, paediatricians,
GPs, public health specialists, pharmacists, voluntary
sector, children and family centre staff
Purposive or theoretical sampling: individuals identified by NHS
managers, primary care networks, antenatal clinics, baby clinics.
Online survey question inviting volunteers for a 15 min telephone
interview/30 min face-to-face interview
UK experts/decision-makers
UK government policymakers for maternal and child
health and public health. Research ethics and research
governance personnel. Expert advisers. Voluntary sector
Purposive or theoretical sampling: individuals identified through
key informants and our advisory panel. Online survey question
inviting volunteers for a 15 min telephone/30 min face-to-face
interviewConference delegates at the: Maternal and Infant
Nutrition and Nurture conference; UK National Smoking Cessation
conference; Public Health in Scotland conference
GP, general practitioner; NHS, National Health Service.
Box 2 Intervention vignette derived from a provider
incentive intervention study13
The Regional Health Authority has requested local health author-
ities to develop local work plans and targets to increase breast-
feeding rates (at birth and 16–19 weeks postnatal). All staff
working within the health authority are told that a financial
penalty will be applied if they do not achieve their objectives and
targets.
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The collective term ‘participant’ is used within the text
to indicate that all participant groups (women/partners,
providers and experts) provided similar comments.
When the points raised speciﬁcally refer to certain
groups, this has been made explicit within the text.
We refer to ‘providers’ as those who deliver a behaviour
change or maintenance intervention. The qualitative
ﬁndings are supported by quotations from participants
followed by a reference, for example (FG1, I, providers).
The ﬁrst code is the participant ID number preceded by
letters that relate to whether the participant took part in
a focus group (FG), interactive discussion (IA), tele-
phone interview (T), survey (S) and no letter relates to a
face-to-face interview. The second code (the presence of
an ‘I’) relates to whether the participant was/had been
involved in an incentive programme. The last code pro-
vides a narrative description of who the participant is.
Ethics and role of the funding source
Full National Research Ethics Service (NRES) and local
ethics approval and R&D permissions were obtained
(North of Scotland Research Ethics Committee
(NOSRES, reference number: 12/NS/0041), University
of Central Lancashire (BUSH064)).
The funders had no role in the data collection, ana-
lysis, interpretation, writing of the manuscript or the
decision to submit. The qualitative research was con-
ducted or overseen by social science and/or health
researchers, three of whom had been involved in incen-
tive interventions (GT, LB and PH). The research team
included previous smokers, those with and without chil-
dren, experiences of breast and formula milk feeding
who held different perspectives on incentive interven-
tions for behaviour change. Differences and potential
biases were discussed in regular team meetings and
noted in reﬂective diaries kept by the qualitative
research team.
RESULTS
Sample characteristics: health professional survey
There were 519 responses to the survey of health profes-
sionals. Of 519 there were 22 (4.2%) who did not answer
any of the survey questions concerning the acceptability
of incentive strategies, and these were excluded from all
analyses. These 22 responses had extensive missing data
on other survey questions and it was not possible to
assess the similarity or otherwise of the excluded to
included respondents. The characteristics of the 497
included respondents are shown in table 2. Midwives
and GPs were the largest professional group to respond;
83% of were female and 88% were working in Scotland.
Sample characteristics: qualitative interviews
Interviews (55 face-to-face; 19 telephone) or focus
groups (n=16) were conducted with 68 pregnant
women, recent mothers and other family members; 32
service providers; 22 experts or decision-makers; and
approximately 63 conference attendees. These are sum-
marised in table 3 and the response rates to the free-text
survey questions on incentive consequences are sum-
marised in table 4. More detailed sample characteristics
are provided elsewhere.12
Table 2 Characteristics of the maternity and early years
health professional sample (n=497)
Variable Classes
Sample
(%)
Sex Male 64 (12.9)
Female 411 (82.7)
Missing 22 (4.4)
Age 18–34 91 (18.3)
35–44 114 (22.9)
45–54 182 (36.6)
55> 85 (17.1)
Missing 25 (5.0)
Ethnicity White 444 (89.3)
BME/prefer not to say 53 (10.7)
White British 339 (68.2)
White Irish 7 (1.4)
White Other 1 (0.2)
Mixed White/Black
Caribbean
1 (0.2)
Mixed Other 1 (0.2)
Asian Indian 10 (2.1)
Asian Pakistani 2 (0.4)
Asian Chinese 1 (0.2)
Black African 2 (0.4)
Refused 35 (7.0)
Smoking
status
Never smoked 370 (74.5)
Current smoker, tried to
stop smoking
17 (3.4)
Current smoker, not tried to
stop smoking
1 (0.2)
Ex-smoker 101 (20.3)
Declined to answer 8 (1.6)
Any children Yes 401 (80.7)
No 96 (19.3)
Breast feeding Any children breast fed 387 (77.9)
No children breast fed 110 (22.1)
Job General practitioner 132 (26.6)
Health visitor 47 (9.5)
Manager 20 (4.0)
Midwife 121 (24.4)
Obstetrician 12 (2.4)
Maternity staff 29 (5.8)
Paediatrician 12 (2.4)
Other nurse 41 (8.3)
Public health staff 32 (6.4)
AHP 18 (3.6)
Support role 8 (1.6)
Researcher 4 (0.8)
Missing 21 (4.2)
Survey region England 60 (12.1)
Scotland 437 (87.9)
AHP, allied health professional; BME, black and minority ethnic.
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Health professional survey results
Financial incentives for meeting smoking cessation during
pregnancy targets
The responses from the health professional survey
revealed net agreement with the provision of provider
incentives to be 52.9% (263/497) and net disagreement
was 28.6% (142/497). From a multiple ordered logistic
regression model, the health visitors/maternity staff
group were more likely than doctors to agree, OR 2.35
(95% CI 1.51 to 3.64; p<0.001), as were other staff, OR
2.18 (95% CI 1.38 to 3.44; p<0.001). Full details of the
univariable and multivariable ordered logistic regressions
are provided in web supplement 1, tables S1 and S2.
Financial incentives for meeting breastfeeding targets
The net agreement for incentives for meeting breast-
feeding targets was 44.1% (219/417) and the net
disagreement was 38.6 (192/417). From a multiple
ordered logistic regression model, the predictors of
agreement were:
▸ Health visitors/maternity care staff group were more
likely than doctors to agree, OR 2.54 (95% CI 1.65 to
3.91; p<0.001), as were other staff, OR 1.94 (95% CI
1.23 to 3.05; p=0.004).
▸ Female respondents were more likely to agree com-
pared with males, OR 1.79 (95% CI 1.06 to 3.91;
p=0.029).
▸ Respondents from England compared with the refer-
ence group Scotland, OR 1.81 (1.09 to 3.00; p=0.023).
Full details of the univariable and multivariable
ordered logistic regressions are provided in web supple-
ment 1, tables S3 and S4.
In table 5, we compare the health professional agree-
ment with the linked and separately reported British
Table 3 Qualitative study participants
Participants Number interviewed Totals and format
Co-applicant mother-and-baby groups Participants N=12
Aberdeenshire n=6 Focus groups* n=3
Blackpool n=6 Face-to-face interviews n=2
Pregnant women and recent parents* Participants N=68
Pregnant women n=18† Focus groups* n=8
Postnatal women n=45 Face-to-face interviews n=19
Partners n=5 Telephone interviews n=6
Providers Participants N=32
Midwifery n=8 Focus groups* n=7
Health visiting n=12 Face-to-face interviews n=9
Doctors: paediatricians, obstetricians, GPs n=5 Telephone interviews n=3
Public health n=3
Smoking cessation specialists/staff n=2
Voluntary sector/children’s centre staff n=2
Experts and decision-makers n=22 Participants N=22
Focus groups* n=4
Face-to-face interviews n=1
Telephone interviews n=7
Public Health, Maternal and Infant Health
Conferences
Range of participants per session involving
policy, decision-makers, experts and some
practitioners
Participants N=∼63
Interactive recorded group
discussions at conferences n=3
*A total of 16 focus groups were conducted. At three focus groups with women/recent parents a provider was present and three focus groups
were a mixture of providers and experts. Two women attended two different focus groups; as did two experts (they are counted once only).
†Two pregnant women were involved in a follow-up postnatal interview (one of whom had an older child at the time of the first interview).
GP, general practitioner.
Table 4 Response rates to free-text questions in the professional survey (n=497 respondents)
Positive
consequences of
incentives to
participants and/or
staff (smoking
cessation)
Negative
consequences of
incentives to
participants and/or
staff (smoking
cessation)
Positive
consequences of
incentives to
participants and/or
staff (breast feeding)
Negative
consequences of
incentives to
participants and/or
staff (breast feeding)
Provided comments N (%) 377 (75.9%) 372 (74.9%) 358 (72.1%) 338 (68.0%)
No data entered. N (%) 93 (18.7%) 102 (20.5%) 110 (22.1%) 121 (24.3%)
Stated ‘no consequences’ or
‘unsure’ N (%)
27 (5.4%) 23 (4.6%) 29 (5.8%) 38 (7.6%)
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general public agreement for the same questions.12
Overall, more health professionals agreed with provider
incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy.
In table 6, we summarise the independent predictors
of agreement for the health professional responses and
compare these with the linked British general public
responses19 for provider incentives for meeting targets
for proven smoking cessation in pregnancy and breast
feeding. Full details of the univariable and multivari-
able ordered logistic regressions for the British general
public survey are provided in web supplement 2,
tables S5–8.
Qualitative insights
Moral tensions around acceptability
Consistent with the survey results, mixed responses with
regard to the acceptability of provider incentives were
reported within the qualitative data. Moral tensions were
evident, as providing support for health-related behav-
iour change and maintenance is considered integral to
employment in a healthcare role, additional income or
beneﬁts for providers were seen as not warranted:
It’s their job and they’re getting paid for it so, no, I don’t
think they should get any extra for it. (24, mother)
Table 5 Survey results comparing the acceptability of financial incentives provided to local health services for meeting
targets for smoking cessation in pregnancy or breast feeding between the British general public and early years health
professional
Survey sample
Payments for meeting smoking cessation
targets
Payments for meeting breastfeeding
targets
Net
agreement
Neither agree
not disagree
Net
disagreement
Net
agreement
Neither agree
not disagree
Net
disagreement
General public (n=1144)19 39.4 23.4 37.2 36.4 25 38.6
Health professionals (n=497) 52.9 18.5 28.6 44.1 17.3 38.6
Table 6 Summary of the independent predictors of health professional and British general public acceptability (+) and
non-acceptability (−) for provider incentives to meet targets for smoking cessation in pregnancy and breast feeding
Survey
Age
<44 Female
Non-white
ethnic
group
Social grade
or job
Current
smoker
(quit
attempts)
Children
breast
fed Region
Local health
services should
receive additional
funding if they
reach targets for
the number of
women who prove
that they have
stopped smoking
during pregnancy
British public +++ − (Social
grade C1)
– (East
Midlands)−
(South West;
Yorkshire &
Humberside;
North; West
Midlands;
Scotland)
Early years
health
professionals
+++
(midwives,
health visitors/
maternity staff)
+++ (other
staff group)
Local health
services should
receive additional
funding if they
reach targets for
the number of
women who
reach targets for
the number of
women who
breastfeed
British public ++ +++ − (South West;
East Midlands;
Scotland)
Early years
health
professionals
++ +++
(midwives,
health visitors/
maternity staff)
+++ (other
staff group)
++ (North West
England)
ORs for acceptability: +, OR 1.0<1.49; ++, OR>1.50<1.99; +++, OR>2.0. Non-acceptability: −, OR>0.5<1; –, OR<0.49.
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Others recognised that incentives can motivate health
professionals, who may feel demoralised for a variety of
reasons, to focus on an area of health improvement as
an activity with value. The UK Baby Friendly accredit-
ation scheme22 can be considered an incentive scheme,
as hospitals meeting quality criteria are presented with
an award and plaque which is often presented in a cere-
mony with media coverage to mark the achievement.
At its best, it’s a very positive, and very, re-enforcing of
the good that you are doing, which makes people feel
good about themselves on all levels, from the health care
assistant right up to the manager, if it is handled prop-
erly, they feel very good about themselves, and they are
incentivized to go forward because of that feeling.
(IA2, I, providers & experts)
A number of the professionals considered provider
incentives to be ‘insulting’ and ‘unethical’ as ‘having a
[professional] relationship with a woman’ and asso-
ciated increases in smoking quit and breastfeeding rates
were the only incentive required. Discussion of the
Cattaneo et al13 vignette (box 2) in terms of disincen-
tives, irrespective of the fact that this intervention was
effective, raised emotive responses in terms of how a
‘penalty target system’ would move away from a ‘hearts
and minds’ collaboration that was needed to address
these behaviours. This point was echoed, although with
more negative connotations, among consumers in rela-
tion to how the ‘breast is best’ rhetoric within maternity
services was more than sufﬁcient:
I deﬁnitely wouldn’t say professionals in breastfeeding
[require incentives]. Because they hammer it on you
enough, they don’t need any incentive. They really lay it
on, they spread it thick. (2, pregnant woman)
A number of the consumers, particularly those from
within the more disadvantaged population groups, cited
anecdotes of smoking, or not breast feeding having little
impact on pregnancy, child health or development.12
Need for incentives
The need for incentives was often negatively or positively
associated with resource implications, either through
opportunity costs in terms of the detrimental impact on
other areas of service delivery, or the substantial savings
of smoking cessation and breast feeding. Examples in
interviews and in the free-text responses in the survey
included the prevention of ‘stillbirth‘,‘small for dates
babies’, ‘lung cancer’, ‘gastroenteritis’ and other
infections.
Providers often felt that the UK was making concerted
efforts in rectifying the ‘appalling’ lack of postnatal care
and breastfeeding support, and noted how the Baby
Friendly Hospital Initiative accreditation,22 designed to
support breast feeding and parent–infant relationships,
had created ‘a massive cultural shift’ through education
of the workforce, with ‘passion’, ‘motivation’ and ‘skills’
over-riding a focus on target attainment. However, as
breast feeding and smoking cessation rates remain low,
particularly in high deprivation areas, coupled with a
lack of resources to invest in service provision, some pro-
fessionals felt that they were ‘failing women’. Incentives
were therefore considered a positive solution that could
help organisations; ‘have it high up on their agenda’
and for additional support to be available when needed:
There’s not enough hours in the day to provide the
support for the women that they need. So perhaps, we
do fail women in that way, so perhaps, a little bit of ﬁnan-
cial support and use this money for somebody an hour a
day to come in and just help, support the women. (53,
midwife)
Some participants considered that if ﬁnancial incen-
tives were shown to be ﬁnancially more effective than
existing strategies or where they were so concerned
about the health effects, they would be willing to ‘try
anything’:
My gut instinct is incentives are wrong, but as you say
we’ve got such an issue and we have to do something and
whatever we end up doing. But if you try a reward
scheme, and even if it seems quite unpalatable and it
works, then the justiﬁcation is right there. (FG9, I,
experts)
There was recognition that incentives can be divisive
both between providers of care and detrimental to rela-
tionships with the women that they aim to help, particu-
larly in the current context where services were
described as ‘overstretched’. An alternative view was that
incentives should be ‘for everybody’ rather than a
dichotomy: either for health service providers or for
women. For example, delivered to organisations, provi-
ders as well as the individual concerned to provide
engagement for all involved:
I think there should deﬁnitely be some sort of target at a
high level and then that should be fed down to people
who are interacting with the people who you want to
affect, and then if the people that have actually got to do
the change, they have got to have a bit of help. (7, preg-
nant woman).
Goals of incentives
A key issue informing the decision about the acceptabil-
ity of provider incentives is to deﬁne the goal to be
achieved. A number of professionals argued how a focus
on incentives and associated target attainment would
minimise the ‘experience of the parents or their
journey’. Intermediate goals, that assessed, for example,
‘enjoyment’ of breast feeding, or the extent to which
parents ‘get the information at the right time’ or ‘felt
supported’, were felt worthy of consideration.
The provider–woman relationship was considered
crucial and concern was expressed about provider incen-
tives for single behaviours and outcomes. A more holistic
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approach was suggested where the goals are decided by
parents from a range of behaviours impacting on health
outcomes:
Rather than just be that about stop smoking if it came
from more of a health improvement function, so more
about general health and what you can do to help your-
self and your baby and family whilst you are pregnant.
(T58, smoking awareness coordinator)
Others expressed a more negative view of targets set
by organisations as dictatorial and having the potential
for ‘a lot of people shouting at you [providers] to
increase the breastfeeding rates’. A programme where
the goal of the incentive is to reward the effort by health
professionals ‘those that are doing the work and putting
in the hours’ rather than targets for behaviour outcomes
in women, was often considered more appropriate.
A further concern was how the goals needed to be
reﬂective of the local community demographics.
Professionals referred to how it would be ‘cruel’ and
‘unfair’ to impose unrealistic goals in areas of high
deprivation where smoking and formula feeding are
more prevalent, creating a situation in which providers
were ‘work[ing] our guts out’ in attempts to ‘control
somebody else’s behaviour’ when ultimately ‘you can’t
make people do things that they don’t want to do’:
If they told us around here that we needed 20% smoking
rate and we don’t get that we’re penalized. We’ll just go,
“Oh, we’re penalized now,” because there isn’t any point
in throwing the money into that because 10% is so far
away. (FG9, experts)
Nuanced goals that were reﬂective of local needs were
more palatable; whether this be ‘providing support for
ongoing breast feeding’ in ‘middle-class’ areas, and
‘incentivising the work’ through encouraging people ‘to
engage with the service’ and ‘get them to think about
breast feeding in the ﬁrst place’ in areas of higher
deprivation. Incentive-driven goals for staff ‘to turn up
to training’, for those who could demonstrate specialist
knowledge, or for referrals into specialist services (for
smoking cessation and/or breast feeding) particularly
among professional groups who are more aligned with
an incentive culture—‘evidence in GPs about changing
behaviours is very convincing by giving them money for
doing it’—were also highlighted.
Collective or divisive action
Incentive provision to all involved (consumers, provi-
ders, organisations) was considered by some participants
to enable a ‘shared aim’ across different individuals and
groups. Incentivising everyone in the system rather than
incentivising individuals was believed to be more likely
to succeed because ‘they are aiming for the same thing’.
‘Shining a light’ on practices through ﬁnancial incen-
tives and associated target setting was also perceived to
be important to encourage a ‘professional approach’
and enable ‘concerted effort to change’ through special-
ist training to bring ‘more people up to the bar’ and
dedicated service provision:
It would make sure that you’ve got the opportunity to
make sure your staff are more highly skilled, there would
be a speciﬁc focus on there or you’re delivering so many
hours a week delivering that service. (T51, lead health
trainer)
Some professionals also considered how provider
incentives could encourage individual staff members to
adopt healthy behaviours, ‘do a better job’, facilitate
better team work and enhance ‘job satisfaction’.
However, the incongruity of incentivising a health pro-
fessional to change a woman’s behaviour, when the
health professionals themselves chose to smoke or not
breast feed was apparent.
A number of participants also considered how the
‘pressure’ of target attainment could lead to profes-
sionals being ‘manipulative’ or ‘coercive in encouraging
people to participate’ with attempts focused on ‘meet
[ing] that target rather than trying to support the
mother’. This was believed to have possible ‘adverse
effects’ on the health professional–mother relationship
with potential negative implications on health
behaviours:
On an individual level, that’s where I get scared because
if a woman felt that an individual health professional was
getting some sort of payment, or incentive, or bonus or
anything that persuaded her to breastfeed, it would have,
I am absolutely certain it would have completely the
opposite effect that you wanted. (IA2, I, providers &
experts)
Some providers felt that the distinction between incen-
tives for reaching targets versus penalties for failing to
reach targets was simply a ‘linguistic difference’, while
others felt strongly that penalties as discussed in relation
to the Cattaneo intervention vignette (box 2) would be
‘counterproductive’ in terms of staff feeling ‘demoti-
vated’, ‘constantly pressurised’ and create ‘low morale’.
Monitoring and proof
Regular monitoring as part of any provider incentive
programme was considered important to provide justiﬁ-
cation for the expenditure, for accuracy in reporting
and to deter gaming. However, this subject generated
considerable debate due to the fallible nature of the
testing methods for smoking, and problems associated
with ‘proof’ of breast feeding. Carbon Monoxide (CO)
monitoring was often considered an imperfect form of
testing, due to levels decreasing rapidly and urine coti-
nine levels were considered invasive by some. Some pro-
viders felt uncomfortable counter-signing to verify
breastfeeding ‘if I didn’t know that it was happening all
the time’ and considered that observations may be ‘too
intrusive’. Furthermore, while home visits to ascertain
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breast feeding (evidence of formula feeding parapherna-
lia) as well as smoking status (house odours/ashtrays)
could be undertaken, there were reservations about ‘the
resources required’ and the potential for misinterpret-
ation (eg, mother mixed feeding or another household
member smoking in the home).
Concerns were also raised about ‘fraudulent’ activity
among professionals due to being motivated by the ‘fear
of the humiliation’ if the targets are not achieved.
Regular or even ‘random’ testing was therefore consid-
ered essential by some participants to ‘prevent the study
coming into disrepute’.
DISCUSSION
This large-scale, in-depth, mixed methods, multistake-
holder study of a contentious issue demonstrated that
incentives for local health service providers to meet
targets for smoking cessation in pregnancy or breast
feeding provoked mixed views, with health visitors and
maternity staff more in favour than doctors. While there
are concerns about the impact on other services, incen-
tives might encourage investment in the skilled support
services that women value, especially in the community.
Outcome veriﬁcation and reporting accuracy are crucial
to address concerns about gaming. Many viewed targets
with caution as they could potentially undermine motiv-
ation in more disadvantaged areas where staff already
struggle with workload. Uniting everyone in an organisa-
tion in supporting women was recognised as a positive
consequence of incentives; however, placing the respon-
sibility unequally on one group, in this case providers of
care, is potentially divisive and could result in conﬂict
and feelings of pressure, blame and guilt. Collective and
partnership approaches to concurrently incentivise
women, families, communities and providers were
voiced as an ideal.
This is the ﬁrst study to compare the acceptability of
provider incentives for breast feeding and smoking ces-
sation in pregnancy. The approach goes beyond existing
‘black box’ frameworks23 to understand why and how
ﬁnancial incentive schemes might ﬁt within early years
healthcare systems. Strengths include the multidisciplin-
ary team with extensive service-user involvement, the
mixed methods approach with preliminary evidence syn-
theses12 and a rigorous sampling strategy to ensure
diverse perspectives were included.
The survey of early years professionals, although the
largest of its kind, has potentially more limited generalis-
ability than we hoped due to selection and response
biases. The response rate was lower than expected, par-
ticularly in North West England. We experienced several
challenges trying to meet our a priori sample size of
1000 participants, with the result that our power to esti-
mate responses is to within 4.4% rather than our
planned 3%. The timing of the survey coincided with
the reorganisation of the NHS in England in spring
2013. Survey distribution was entirely dependent on the
email gatekeepers; eligible participants could have
received the email from more than one source or not at
all and it was not possible to calculate accurate denomi-
nators. Private companies do not appear to be the solu-
tion to accessing health professional perspectives.
Despite our best attempts, we failed to identify any
robust strategy for UK regional or national surveys of
maternity and early years health professionals due to the
logistic difﬁculties of identifying and gaining the
approval of the gatekeepers to email lists. Discussions
with academic colleagues and searching for key publica-
tions24 conﬁrmed that this is a current UK challenge.
We also compared the health professional survey
responses with the ﬁndings of the survey of the British
general public,19 which may be open to criticism due to
the potential selection bias for the former. However, as
this research has the potential to inform important
policy decisions, we juxtapose the data with a statement
of caution about interpretation to provide a more com-
plete picture. One of the reasons as to why the general
public may be less likely to agree with provider incen-
tives stems from ‘no harm’ narratives, with lack of aware-
ness or even denial of medical evidence or resistance to
being told how to behave.12
Health visitors and maternity care staff were more
likely to agree with provider incentives and they are the
professional group that such a strategy would primarily
impact. The sample was predominantly women, which
reﬂects the early years workforce and most had breast
fed a child. The potential for incentives to increase
resources for breast feeding and smoking cessation ser-
vices appeared to be the basis for their expressed favour.
Others have cautioned against attributing the failure of
some incentive initiatives to self-interested and resistant
health professionals.23 25
The experience of the UK primary care QOF system,
which is part of the independent contractor employ-
ment contract with the NHS, is likely to have inﬂuenced
the data collected and hence generalisability to health
systems in other countries. GPs have considerable
freedom in how they manage practice resources. In con-
trast, the current QOF employment contract does not
directly include early years community staff like midwives
and health visitors who are employed and whose base-
line salaries, unlike GPs, would not be impacted by
incentive schemes. This is likely to explain some of the
observed differences in acceptability between profes-
sional groups. The current context of increasing ﬁscal
constraint, with accounts of squeezed support services
around childbirth and early years and staff shortages26
will have impacted on our data. In our view, this
strengthens the rationale for conceptualising incentives
as part of complex ecological systems rather than sim-
plistic intervention components, due to the need for
public services to rapidly adapt and evolve to thrive and
survive in the current ﬁscal climate.
Decision frameworks and checklists are available to
assess when provider incentives might do more good
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than harm, to help prevent premature or inappropriate
implementation.27 28 Some of our themes around need,
goals, accountability and monitoring map directly to
these frameworks. However, they are written through a
decision-maker’s lens, problematise care provision in iso-
lation and focus primarily on utilitarian values rather
than a societal perspective. We argue that they are
‘jumping the gun’, as our study reveals the complexity of
the crucial precursors to interventions, namely under-
standing their mechanisms of action and acceptability.29
The Medical Research Council complex intervention
guidance29 provides the rationale for this study, which
set out to build a platform for the design of incentive
trials. Public patient involvement was integral and is an
underpinning policy for research prioritisation and
conduct in the UK.30 Research to date has neglected the
personal perspectives and emotional responses to such
incentives and the context in which they are delivered.
Financial incentives provided to women contingent on
breast feeding evoke concerns about the positive and
negative consequences on relationships.31 Our eco-
logical approach to understanding incentives as events
within complex systems suggests that causal pathways are
not linear and straightforward. Meanings of incentives
and the context in which they are delivered is likely to
impact on feasibility, effectiveness and future implemen-
tation in the real world.32 Others have argued that struc-
tured rigorous experimental research33 is needed to test
different doses of incentive/penalty components of
interventions, select the optimal targets for both quality
improvement and achievement.34 Taking breast feeding
as an example, ﬁnancial penalties13 or losses of accredit-
ation14 are likely to have different mechanisms of action
and therefore different effect sizes from ﬁnancial15 or
accreditation gains.22 People are more motivated to
avoid losses than they are to achieve similarly sized gains
(loss aversion).35 Importantly, representatives of all those
potentially involved: service users, families, practitioners,
managers, communities, should be involved in the
experimental designs to ensure an incentive systems
approach with win-win goals for everyone including the
tax payer. As our ﬁndings highlight, the current dichot-
omous conceptualisation of either patient or provider
incentives may be destined to create tensions and be
counter-productive. This ﬁts the theory that individual
responses to extrinsic provider incentives will be
complex as health professionals have high levels of
intrinsic motivation to improve patients’ health which
could be crowded out with potentially detrimental con-
sequences for healthcare.36 A partnership approach to
intervention design30 should build on behaviour change
theory which translates across disciplines and purposes,
like SMART goal setting,37 monitoring and feedback38
and social marketing techniques like award ceremonies
for achievements and dissemination of good practice.
Learning from the commercial sector where incentive
schemes aim to build loyalty and trust, as the process of
achieving the desired behaviour, could have relevance.39
Equal consideration should be given to research
methods which capture the unintended consequences
of incentives, particularly the demotivation that can
result from stigma, feelings of failure, guilt or blame.40
A review of pay for performance concludes that giving
priority to prevention of illness would require a radical
rethink of the incentives.41 Community commitment
contracts to improve behaviours related to child health
in developing countries show promise42 and should be a
priority research area for child health innovation in
developed countries. The most deprived communities
where unhealthy behaviours are most prevalent could
beneﬁt; however, a counter argument is that these areas
require additional funding regardless of meeting targets,
as it is not an even playing ﬁeld. The effect of incentivis-
ing both recipients and providers may be less than the
same as or greater than the sum of the two.
CONCLUSION
Our study has increased the understanding of the com-
plexity around offering incentives to providers to change
health-related behaviours for women around childbirth.
Given the mixed acceptability, the lack of evidence for
effectiveness and the importance of additional psycho-
social support to help women to stop smoking and
breast feed, experimental research is required prior to
policy interventions. However, partnership and whole
systems approaches are required to ﬁnd a win-win incen-
tive strategy for all stakeholders that minimises the risk
of adverse consequences.
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